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Belspo, as part of the Belgian Presidency of the Council of the EU, organized a panel on “Cyber Resilience in Space Workshop: Mapping Challenges, Forging Resilience”.
Two main things to remember from these 2 conferences :
– The imminent establishment of the EU Space ISAC
and
– The future publication EU Space Law which will support the resilience of our ecosystem

Nous sommes ravis de partager la tribune « Parole d’Expert » de Matthias POPOFF, analyste marché chez CyberInflight, publié par le CyberCercle.

Les enjeux majeurs en matière de cybersécurité appliquée au spatial y sont présentés, un sujet d’une importance capitale à une époque où la technologie et l’espace sont de plus en plus interconnectés.

Au programme :
– La jonction du cyber et du spatial au carrefour des compétences
– Le spatial à l’épreuve de la guerre en Ukraine
– L’état de l’art de la cybersécurité spatiale
– La place du cyberspatial dans la conduite des opérations

L’article est consultable sur: https://cybercercle.com/paroledexpert-matthias-popoff-cyberinflight-08092023/

#Cybersécurité #Espace #Technologie #Satellite #ParoleDExpert #Cybercercle

The evolution of SPARTA is a perfect illustration of how the cyber domain is increasingly taking into account the specificities of the space domain. This adaptation is carried out through multiple publications by NIST, MITRE and others. SPARTA is at the forefront of this trend and continues to include new elements to facilitate its use.

1-     TTP Notional Risk Scores

Two objectives:

To establish the likelihood of an attack due to the uniqueness of every mission and system implementation.

To illustrate adversary capability which contributes to the likelihood that an actor can execute certain SPARTA TTPs.

In order to produce an analysis on the TTPs potential impact, this results in a NOTIONAL risk determination with three notional risk values sorted by system/mission criticality (high, medium, low).

2-     ISO 27001 Mapping

SPARTA is adapting to other regional contexts and rules. This mapping was performed using NIST’s published mapping between NIST 800–53 rev5 and ISO 270001.

3-     D3FEND Technique and Artifact Mappings

SPARTA aims to provide a translation/mapping of D3FEND (Denial, and Disruption Framework Empowering Network Defense) techniques from MITRE and artifacts to the relevant SPARTA countermeasures. This should enable users of SPARTA to bridge the gap between countermeasures/courses of actions (COAs).

4-     Additional References

In SPARTA version 1.3.2, over 20 TTP references were updated using CyberInflight’s Market Intelligence Team’s space attack database. In version 1.4, the integration of our data has been fully completed. Approximately 50 attacks were added to the appropriate techniques/sub-techniques under the reference section for each TTP.

Roughly 60% of the attacks that we provided fall within the Reconnaissance and Resource Development tactics, which is a precursor to almost all attacks. This reinforces how important the Protect Sensitive Information countermeasure is because threat actors are actively extracting sensitive design information. In some cases, threat actors’ objectives are simply Exfiltration or Theft, and these attacks could be achieving their objective simply by stealing the information.

For more information, don’t hesitate to check the DEFCON31 presentation and SPARTA

Source: https://medium.com/the-aerospace-corporation/sparta-v1-4-whats-new-1ecdbf4873d7

#satellite #cybersecurity #cybersécurité #space

In late July, a hacker going by the name “samurai” and associated with the group “SecDet” claimed to have gained access to several hashtag#satellites, including CBERS-2/B, GLS-LANDSAT, and LANDSAT-1/7. These accesses were allegedly obtained by exploiting vulnerabilities in the INPE (National Institute for Space Research) in Brazil. The hacker’s claim was detailed on their website, where they outlined their malicious actions against databases and servers belonging to INPE.

Cyberattacks targeting the space sector

CyberInflight conducts data collection and analysis of cyberattacks targeting the space sector. This data is included in our attacks database, which is available for purchase.

For more information regarding this database or our economic intelligence report on the cybersecurity space market, feel free to contact us at the following email address: research@cyberinflight.com

#satellite #cybersecurity #space

On June 28-29, 2023, a series of messages on a Telegram channel claimed a large-scale cyber attack against Dozor-Teleport. Along with the claim messages, numerous files to download, an audio recording, and several screenshots were made available. The attacker(s) claimed affiliation with the Wagner Group without providing any additional evidence.

The information was first picked up on Twitter by pro-Ukrainian accounts. It quickly leaked to numerous cybersecurity news sites worldwide. Within 12 hours, major news outlets such as The Washington Post reported the information. Within 24 hours, the information was present on a range of media platforms.

During this dissemination, the information underwent a true game of “Chinese whispers.” The initial articles simply reproduced the information as it was published on Twitter or Telegram, barely mentioning that it was what the attackers claimed. Subsequently, various media outlets started amplifying the information. Headlines suggested that a Russian military hashtag#satellite network had been hacked before articles began appearing about hacked Russian military communication satellites.

In general, several issues continue to arise regarding the treatment of information about attacks in the space domain:

1️Once the word “satellite” is mentioned, the information suddenly gains interest in terms of cybersecurity. The reason is simple: the combination of space and cyber can quickly evoke fascination. The downside is that sensationalist headlines often multiply.

There is a clear lack of perspective regarding information related to cyberattacks. The need to be the first to publish information (which is understandable) leads to approximate or poorly verified information spreading rapidly.

The study and questioning of sources are rarely emphasized. Many press articles simply republish what has already been said without verifying the primary source of the information. As a result, basic information quickly becomes considered as true. For example, based on a given analysis on Twitter, it has been repeated by numerous media outlets that it was the first attack on a satellite provider since Viasat, which is false.

In the era of OSINT (Open-Source Intelligence), the amount of available information is considerable, but there is a lack of necessary reflection for understanding the information. Consequently, certain major cyberattacks that occurred over a year ago, such as the Viasat hashtag#attack, remain particularly vague in both their execution and impact.

#spacecybersecurity  #satellite  #cyber

Space security issues can be traced back to the 1980s. In 1989, several systems were hit by a computer virus called “WANK”.

Although suspicion initially focused on one or more French attackers, investigations soon established that the attack had originated from Australia. Some would go so far as to say that this attack was one of Julian Assange’s first moves. Assange had decided to attack NASA because the agency was planning to launch a nuclear-powered satellite, and many activists associated this with the danger of nuclear power (the 1986 Chernobyl disaster was still fresh in everyone’s minds). Assange then decided to attack NASA’s systems in order to delay the launch. There is still a great deal of doubt as to the origin of the attack.

The 1980s-1990s were a golden age for hacktivism, with the emergence of hacker culture. This period and the decades that followed quickly established NASA as a prime target. A space agency reflects the politics of its country, and indeed, space agencies in many countries are particularly targeted.

At CyberInflight, we continuously monitor the evolution of the threat and establish trends that feed into our business intelligence studies in the field of space cybersecurity.

For further information, please contact us at : research@cyberinflight.com